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STATE'fE~;T

OF Kic;D OF CASE

This is a criminal prosecution for aggra1ated assault, involving
the shooting of the victim on the highway with enhancement of sentence
for use of a firearm or facsimile in commission of a felony.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COl'RT

The aggravated assault case was tried to a jury who convicted the
Appellant of aggravated assault.

The trial judge made a finding of use

of a firearm and invoked the enhancement provision of the penaltv statute.
From the verdict and judgment of conviction and committment on the
enhancement statute Defendant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction, an order
remanding for new trial, suppressing use of the .22 caliber pistol in
evidence or alternately, remand for evidentiary hearing on suppression
and/or that the committment on the

enhance~ent

provision of Ctah Code

Annotated §76-3-203 be vacated.
STATEXENT OF FACTS

On the 20th dav of July, 1977, Clyde Davies was driving a truck
southbound on I-15 near Santaquin, Ctah, when he was shot.

The driver

of a truck ~Gllowing him heard a loud noise at about the sane time and
cOser~:e::i a white ':an on c'.-ie :lO-Cthbound side of the ::.i5h·11a:,·.
~as

Defendan~

stoppej a~d jetai:led ~ea 1 1i:lg I-15 in ~is ~hite ·ran, and a search of
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the van was conducted, turning up a .22 caliber pistol and a number of
empty shell casings.

The Defendant •;as tried and convicted of the char;c

of aggravated assault before a jurv.

The inform;Hion made no reference ,,

the enhancement provision of the penalty statute for use of a firearm.
The jury was not provided with a verdict form on the enhancement provisico
and the essential elements of the crime as char8ed, did not include an
element on the use of a firearm.

.-\t sentencing, the trial judge made a

finding that a firearm had been used and invoked the enhancement provisi0ns,
sentencing the Defendant to two consecutive sentences of not less than
five years in prison.

ARGL~ENT

I.

THE SEARCH OF THE DEFE).'])NlT' S VEHICLE WAS CONDL'CTED \·?ITHOUT PROBABLE

CAUSE, PRIOR TO ARREST, .-\ND WITHOUT THE CONSE:lt OF THE APPELLA.'./T, AND
ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN THE SEARCH SHOL'LD HAVE BEEN SL'PRESSED.

Sometime shortly following the shooting of Mr. Davies, the

Appel~nt

was stopped on the highway and a search was conducted of his vehicle.
search

re~ealed

This

a .22 caliber pistol in the rear portion of the van tha:

became the primary evidence against hi!Il in trial.

'.."he problem then becomos

to determine the authority under which the search was conducted and
whether it meets the standards ?rescribed for warrantless searches under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendm.ents to the Constitution.
Searches conducted outside the judicial proc2ss •,;it:hout prior appro,·a.
by a judge or magistra~e are, per se, unre3sonab~e ~nder the Four~h

..\mendrner.t, 3ub~ect on2.:: to a :et...· specif:_cal1.y established 3.:1.d ·.Jell-d2l:~e~.::.1
excepticns.

K2.tz

·1.

r_·ni:ei States, 339 '...'.S. 3..'..7, 357 19 LEd ~~ 516, 533.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

-The burden is on those seeking exemption to show the need for it.

United

States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 41, 96 LEd 59, 64.
One exception is a search incident to an arrest.

In order for a

search incident to an arrest to stand, the arresting officer must have
sufficient probable cause to arrest the Defendant, must lawfully effectuate
the arrest, and must place the Defendant in custody.
414 U.S. 260.

Gustafson v. Florida,

While in the present case the person of the Defendant was

seized and detained, and he may well be considered to have been in custody,
there existed neither probable cause for an arrest nor the lawful effectuation
of an arrest.

In order to judge the probable cause for arrest, probable

cause must be judged solely on that information and evidence available to
the arresting officer at the time the Appellant's vehicle was stopped.

The

arresting officer may not rely upon evidence obtained in a search conducted
after the arrest in order to provide probable cause for the arrest.

Henry

v. United States, 361 U.S. 98; Rios v. United States, 364 C.S. 253; Whiteley
v. Warden of Wvoming State Penetentiary, 401 U.S. 560.

We must, then consider

what knowledge was available to the arresting officer when he stopped
Appellant and "detained" him for "investigation".

The officer '"as aware

that someone (:-lr. Davies) had been injured and probably shot.

He was aware

that the shooting had taken place a short distance away on Interstate Highway
15.

He was aware that another person (''.r. Child) had heard a loud noise

at about the same time that ~[r. Davies was shot, and that he had observed a
white van heading the opposite direction on the Interstate.

This information

is further supported by another report of a loud noise and that a cream colored
van was across the highway at that time.

There was no information on any

persons within the van or vans and nothing out of the ordi~ary about the

conduct of the van or its driver or any passengers.

There is not even a
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strong inference that the shots were fired from a vehcile, let alone the
white van.

However, it is certainly reasonable that the police officers,

upon being informed that someone had been shot and additionally advised
that at that time a white van was across the high1o:a:1 with soeo.e corrobora~:
in antoher report of a loud noise coupled with the ;iroxiriity of a cream ·:c:
that the police would attempt to locate any white or cream vans in the areo
in order to question the driver and any passengers, and at least
their identity.

ascer~~

But no magistrate would issue a warrant of arrest or

allow a complaint to stand based upon such evidence, and accordingly, there
was not sufficient probable cause to arrest Appellant and any search incic;··
to such arrest is defective and testimony with regards thereto and evidence
located must be suppressed.
It is additionally questionable whether the Appellant was in fact
arrested by the officer.

'.v"hen he was stopped, Officer Bradford did not ai

him he was under arrest, but told him he was being " ... detained while we
investic;ate the situation" (transcript pa?e 49, lines 6-7)

This would sec

to demonstrate that Officer Bradford knew there was no probable cause ford:
arrest at that time, and did not then intend to arrest.
Even though there was not sufficient probable cause :o arrest, this
would not prohibit the Appellant being stopped for investigation.

Emplo;·cc.:

the princi;:iles of good police work, Officer Bradford knew that a driver.,:
a ·"'hite ':an ::iay have been involved in criminal conduct.

He could, there£

stop a white van in the area of a crime, and could conduct a search of
the person of the ,::,=i~1er of the vehicle.

Terr·; v. Jhio, 392 L~.s. l; ~
1

''· )lew Ycrk, 392 C.S. 40; Adao-.s -;, ·.,'illians, 407 C.S. 1-+3.
of this typ2 of scare'.!

11
•••

is nc~

t.)

disco·;er 2·:i.2ence ~=

3ut the ?uC'·'''
,:t

cri:ie Ju: t:
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1

allow the officer to pursue his investifation without fear of violence."
Adams v. 1-:illiams, supra at 146.

Accordingly, the scope of such a "stop and

frisk" search is limited to the individual and such limited surroundings
as are reasonably necessary to protect the safety of the officer.
Ohio, supra; Adams v. Williams, supra.

Terry v.

The arresting officer might then search

the person of the Appellant for weapons and look into the van to ascertain
it held no other persons, but, the .22 caliber pistol which was discovered
in the rear of the van, and out of sight, was well beyond the scope of such
a search.

Officer Bradford testified "I really had to look hard, but finally

found it ... " (Transcript page 44, lines 4 and 5)

There can, then, be no

pretense that the officer's search was for the purpose of protecting his person
and guarding against possible physical harm by the Appellant.
Another exception allows police to make a warrantless search of a motor
vehicle even when it is not incident to arrest, and where there may not be
probable cause to arrest, if they have probable cause to justify the search.
Carol v. l!nited States, 267 U.S. 132; Chambers v.

~-!aronev,

399 C.S. 42.

While this is tantamount to an expost facto type of warrant, it is justified
upon the transitory nature of •1ehicles.

Chambers, supra.

The difference in

probable cause required for search of a vehicle is applied to the vehicle in
much the same way probable cause for arrest is applied to an individual.

In

Chambers, the court provided that the similarity of vehicle descriptions
including partial descriptions of the occupants, gave probable cause to search
the vehicle.

But there was a great deal more in that case to distinguish the

vehicle from all ohters on the road besides its color and type as in the
instant =ase.

There were four persons in the suspect vehicle, four in the

stopped 'iehicle.

The clot~!ifl.g of some of the passengers ::natched that of some
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of the suspects.

But the greatest difference is that in Chambers, the

vehicle description was of a vehicle known to have been involved in the
crime not just in the area of the crime.
If the description of a person conunitting a crime was broadcast, a
person answering that description might be arrested, but i f the descriptirr.
was merely that of a person seen in the area of the crime, there would not
be probable cause for an arrest.
It is an exception to the requirement for probable cause for a search
that the Defendant may consent to the conduct of the search.

Davis v. Cnite:

States, 328 U.S. 582; Zat v. United States, 328 U.S. 624; Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347.
Officer Bradford claims that he conducted the search with the
the Appellant.

cons~t
v~b

After stopping the Appellant, he was ordered from the

loud speaker, told to place his hands on the van and was searched.

'

He

~s

infon;ied by Officer Bradford that he was going to be "detained" and that c.i;
van was going to be searched.

(See Transcript page 4ti lines 23-2j)

He was

not advised of his rights or informed that he could refuse the search.

Th1

Appellant did not consent to the search, but merely consented to authorit:1.
This is not consent, and cannot make an unlac,;ful search lawful.

Bu'.Ilper '1 ·

North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 20 LEd 2 797.
The .22 caliber pistol was seized in an unlawful search and shou~ ~
suppressed, and Appellant's conviction reversed or remanded for an evident:,·
hearing to determine if the evidence of the search should be suopressei.
II.

UTAH CODE A:l~CTATED §76-3-203 APPLES TWO S'OPAP.UE SE:iTE:iCES ~''R THE

SA:rE CRI'.1I:iAL ACT' A.'iD' nlEREFORE' L!POSES :!Oc3LE ?lciISHYEC!T' ?Rt'HI31'S'l
BY THE FIFTH .\XD ?Ot:?::::::E:;TH .-\.'!Ec!DME:;TS TO 7'.-lE CO'lSTIT1:T:::o:; '.JF CHE c:lT-E'

STATES.
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It is long established doctrine that the Fifth

~mendment

not only

protects against being twice tried for the same offense, but prohibits
Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall 163, 21 LEd 872;

double punishment.

United

States v. Ewell, J8J U.S. 116; c;orth Carolina v. Pearce, 395 l:.S. 711.
This is applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment
~arvland,

Benton v.

395 U.S. 784.

In providing a statutory scheme for enhancement of sentence for use of
a firearm in the commission of a crime Utah Code Annotated 76-3-203
chooses rather than enlarging the basic sentence to provide for an entirely
separate and distinct sentence.

One that does not begin to run until the

Defendant has completed serving the sentence for the crime itself.
There is some precedence that multiple punishments may consititutionally
be imposed as the consequence of a single criminal, but only if they
constitute separate statutory offenses.

234 U.S. 299.

Blockburger v. United States,

In the instant case, the Appellant was charged and tried

for only one statutory offense, but was sentenced to two separate and
consecutive sentences of not to exceed five years, and the second sentence
of not to exceed five years should be vacated.
III.

FAILURE TO PROVIDE RL.\SONA.BLE

~OTICE

OF THE INTENT TO

I~-VOKE

THE

E:)<1lANCE)!DiT PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ..\..'iNOTATED §76-3-203 DENIED APPELL.AXT
DUE PROCESS OF

LA~.

At no point in the proceeding o.rraignment, preliminary hearing, district
court arraignment or trial did the Appellant receive any notice or warning
of either the exi3tence of or any intention

~f

the state to proceed upon

the firearm E=nhance!!lent provisivns of Utan Code --'nnctated §76-3-203, in
~ace,

che record is 3ilent ~ith regari to ei:~er th~s section

0r

its special
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potential until sentencing.

Accordingly,

the

Def~ndant

•,·3s afforded no

reasonable notice and opportunity either at trial or later to confront

the issues involved in the enhancement statute, or to plan his

strateg~

and bargain plea based on a realization of the full potential of his
exposure.

Failure to provide the Defendant reasonable notice is a deniai

of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth ·'°'mendments of the Constit•ct'.·
of the United States.

Ovler v. Boles, 368 C.S. 448.

IV.

FAILURE TO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR A FINDING SPECIFICALLY ON THE L"SE

OF A

FIRE~l

ELE~1ENT

OR

FACSI~1ILE

AS OPPOSED TO A DEADLY WEAPON EITHER THROUGH .'LI

TO THE OFFDJSE OR VERDICT CONSTITCTES FAILCRE TO I:.:VOKE THAT SECT'

The State, through the County Attorney, has a
determing what a !)efendant will have to ans;.·er.

~road

discretion in

Each criminal act is usus::

surrounded 1Cith a myriad of potentials for criminal prosecution.

The Couc.t

Attorney is charged with reviewing these potentials, ?.nd charging

those~~,~:

can best be proved and that best fit the situation.

It is an affirmati••

duty on the part of the State to advise the Defendant of those c~car~es it
intends to prove.

The State of California, T,,:hich has d similar use :Jf a firParJJ. st3.t'.::::
(California Penal Code Section 12022.5) has ruled :hat unless the Stace

takes affirmative action to indicate its choi~e to pursue the enhanceme~t

provision at trial, it ma:1 ~ot be invoked
People v.

~ajera,

503 ?2d 1353 (Ca:.

at sente~cing and is wa::.~ed.

i972)

(c;uotirtg from ?eople ·;, 3~.;:-.

99 Cal '<.ptr 681, 691, S. Cal. A?P· 3d 736, 30:)

t'1e Court states:

"It seeri.s ~ot unr-e3.sondDl~ to hoL: t'.-!at ::he fa::.lure
cf :he ?rcsec_:icn t~ re~~est eithe~ tie ~2:essar:·
~ur:7 inst-r ...1..:.ti0n, or :i1e ;u:mission 0:: :'he re·-~ 1~is:te
1
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special ·1erdict, should be taken as an indication
that Section 12022.5 has not been invoked." Id at 1358.

The language of Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203 is specific in its
requirement for a "finding" by the jury that a "firearm or facsimile or

representation of a firearm" was utilized in the corunission or furtherance
of the crime.
es~ential

This creates a new and additional element that is an

element to the application of the enhancement provision.

When

the court in the instant case instructed the jury in its Instruction No.
no element on the use of a firearm or facsimile thereof

~~s

included.

The jury was required to find only that a dangerous weapon as required by
the aggrevated assault statute was used.

Utah Code Annotated §76-5-103.

Failure to so instruct denied the Appellant the right to a finding he
was entitled to by the statute before its full force and effect could be
Drought to bare against him.
The case should either be remanded for new trial on all issues or the
State deeoed to have waived invokation of the enhancement provision and
the sentence thereon declared void and vacated.

V.

CT.\H CODE ..\..'lc!OTATED §76-3-203 CREATES A SEPAP~HE A:lD uISTI~Gt:ISHA5LE

OFFD<SE WHICH \fl'ST BE PLE'.l AS A SEPXUTE CHARGE TO BE IXVOKED.

The

enhance~ent

provision ::ir use of a f irear:i is contained within

the ?enalty ?rovision o~ the cri~inal code, and f~rther liste~ as an adjunct

:o :he description of the

enr.a~ce::ent ?C~t~,:.n

::-f :.he

~elony

involved.

3t2t·Jt~ ·.,:culd

The ?revisions of that Section

seem

to

?ro•1ide a separate and
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distinguishable criminal offense.
The Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968,
provides enhancement of sentence for being armed with a firearm in the
commission of a federal crime.

This provision, like Utah's, being found.

within the punishment of the code.

18 U.S.C. §924(c).

Although the federa:

law is distinguishable in that it enlarges the basic sentence rather than
providing a separate sentence, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has
construed the federal law to provide a separate offense which must be
charged as a separate count to the information.
457 F2d 1198, 25 ALR Fed. 671.

United States v. Sudduth,

Further, holding that an enhanced sentence

predicated on the firearm provision alone could not be imposed on an

ind~t·l

I

charging only an independent felony.
(CA 10 1972).

United States v. Vigil, 458 F2d 385

The Federal Omnibus Act has also been construed to create

separate crimes by the Second Circuit in United States v. Ramirez, 482 FM
807 (CA 2 1973)cert den 414 U.S. 1070.
It would seem that the legislature in setting an additional sentence
separate and apart from that carried by the basic charge probably envisione'
a separate crime as the federal law has been interpreted, one that would ha·,,
to be charged before it could be

invo~ed,

one that would have to provide a

Defendant of reasonable notice of its intended use as required 'oy

~

Boles, supra, and one upon which the Defendant is entitled to a specific
jury instruction and elements for the
jurv on t'1at issue.

cri~e

and a verdict

~y

the

..\ccordingly, the sen:ence of the Appellar.t on the

enhancement s ta :ute s'.-iould be vacated.
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VI.

TiiE flCIDDIGS OF FACT REQCIRED BY CTAH CODE AO.'°:'iOTATED §76-3-203(3)

WAS :L.llJE BY THE JUDGE RATHER THA.'i THE JCRY AXD

DE~IED

APPELLA.''11 HIS RIGHT

TO TRIAL BY JURY.
The enhancement portion of Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203 requires
that there be a finding by the trier of fact with regards to the utilization
of the firearm.

It is well settled that in any case involving criminal

conduct where a jury is present, that the finder of fact is the jury.
In the instant case, as discussed above, there was no element included in
the charge that made a separate and distinguishable finding that a firearm
or facsimile was usec, neither was there a verdict, special or otherwise,
employed to make a finding as required by the statute.

This seems to be

recognized by the trial judge in the language of the comrnittment. The
cornmittment of the Court issued on the 28th day of October, 1977, sentences
the Defendant to a term in the Utah State Prison of not to exceed five years
for the underlying

ch~rge

of aggrevated assault, but goes on:

"in addition

thereto, the Court finds that a firearm was used in the commission of the
crime, and therefore, under the provisions of §76-3-203(3) of the criminal
code, the ]efendant is sentenced to an additional term not to exceed five
years.

Sentence to run consecutively, net concurrently." (emphasis added)

Accordingly, the Court by its own language has made its own independent
finding of what must be a specific element of the crime, and has thereby
2

usurped the function and duty of the jury. People v. ~Tajera, 503 "wd 1353 (Cal
1972)Appellant was not provided a finding by the jury on an essential issue
0f :act, this finding cannot be made by the Court no matter how compelling
it may seem and may not be inferred from the general verdict of the jury.
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G

Appellant was entitled to a specific finding which finding was denied
him and his conviction should be reversed.

CONCLUSIONS
I

The search of Defendant's vehicle was in violation of his rights unde:
the Fourth Amendment.

The gun seized in the search should have been

suppressed, and Defendant's conviction for aggrevated assault should be
reversed.
Alternatley, as the issue of protection against unlawful search and
seizure is so fundemental to American jurisprudence and as the issue was
not clearly dealt with in the lower court, the case should be remanded fM
an evidentiary hearing on the suppression issue.

II

The enhancement provisions of Ltah Code Annotated §76-3-203 is an

J

unconstitutional imposition of double punishment and Defendant's comrnittcl
therefore, should be reversed.
Alternately, the failure to plead or otherwise put the question of
the enhancement ;irovision at issue 1-·as either a choice not to invoke by
the State or denies Ap[Jellant due [Jrocess of law.

It was improper fort~"'

judge on his ow"TJ. to invoke the ?ro 1isicn, mat<e his '.Jh"TI finding exclusive :·i
1

the jury and impose sentence thereon.
provisicn

s~ould

The sentence on the enhancement

be reversed and vacated.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

